Committee: NATO
Issue of: A Proxy War at NATO's Border: Non-State Support and Alliance Friction in North Syria - As Of 1 January 2026 - Topic 1
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NOTE: Due to the rapidly shifting regional dynamics, **all military & state positions and stances must be evaluated as the situation stood up till 1 January 2026**.

PREPARATORY MANDATORY DIRECTIVE: All delegates must review the treaty and structure upon which they operate at [The North Atlantic Treaty | NATO Official text] and [What is NATO?] prior to participating in the Council's sessions.

MODULE 1: Executive Summary and Historical Foundation

1.1 Executive Summary: The North Syria Crisis & Inter-Alliance Contradictions

The ongoing conflict in North Syria brings forward one of the most complex, and intricate, geopolitical paradoxes of modern international law, treaties, alliances and military strategy. Following the post-2011 breakdown of Syrian state authority under civil war and the subsequent territorial expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), North-East Syria has transformed into a theater of non-stop, overlapping interventions from many different sides.

At the centre of this crisis lies a fundamental divergence among key NATO powers:

The Intra-Alliance Division
Türkiye: Sovereign Security Imperative ● Mandate: Eradication of Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTO) - linked quasi-states along its sovereign border. ● Stance: The YPG/SDF is an extension of the PKK; its foreign-backing violates Turkish national security and *NATO Article 5* collective-defence principles.
U.S. and France (the Western allies): The Counter-ISIS Capsule ● Mandate: Permanent degradation of ISIS and management of mass ISIS detention centres. ● Stance: The SDF is a crucial tactical partner under *UN Charter Article 51 / UNSC Resolution 2249*; DAANES civil stabilisation is vital to prevent ISIS re-emergence.

This friction continues to test the cohesion of the alliance. By relying on a non-state side, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to execute ground operations under *Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)* and *Opération Chammal*, the Western allies have established and grounded a de facto security umbrella over a territory governed by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES).
To Ankara, this translates to blatant Western enablement of an illegal armed network branching from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to flourish on Türkiye's southern border. To Washington and Paris, abandoning the SDF risks the immediate dissolution of mass detention centres holding thousands of hardened ISIS terrorists, collapsing counter-terrorism containment and creating a catastrophic security vacuum in the region.
This background provides the North Atlantic Council with a summary of the legal, historical and operational groundwork required to navigate these competing security viewpoints, guaranteeing sovereignty without compromising counter-terrorism mechanisms, while maintaining the strength, power and unity of the alliance.

1.2 Ethno-Political Genesis: Kurdish Identity, the PKK and the Ideological Pivot to Qandil Mountains

To evaluate the legitimacy and legal-ambiguity of current non-state governance in North Syria, we must first analyse the transnational descent of Kurdish political movements across Türkiye, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

A. The Historic Transnational Kurdish Dynamic

The Kurds, an indigenous ethno-linguistic group historically native to upper Mesopotamia, were left without a sovereign state following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I under the *1923 Treaty of Lausanne*. Modernly divided over four states (Türkiye, Syria, Iraq and Iran), Kurdish populations developed different distinct political and ideological trajectories.

B. The Founding of the PKK and the Qandil Safe Havens

In 1978, AbdullAh Öcalan founded the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Türkiye as a Marxist-Leninst insurgent movement, seeking an independent, socialist Kurdish State. Launching a full-scale military rebellion against the Turkish state in 1984, the PKK established its primary military headquarters, command councils and operational safe havens in the jagged Qandil Mountains, northern Iraq.
The PKK is formally recognised as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by Türkiye, the U.S., the European Union and NATO.

Entity	Ideology & Command Headquarters / Origin	Operational Scope & Legal Status
PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)	Marxist-Leninst **Command:** Qandil Mountains, Iraq (1984)	Decades of armed-conflict against Türkiye. Recognised as an FTO by TR, US, EU and NATO.
PYD (Democratic Union Party)	Democratic Confederalism **Origin:** Syria (2003)	Political vanguard in Syria. Linked to PKK through the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union) framework.
YPG (People's Protection Units)	Armed Wing of PYD **Origin:** North Syria (2011-2012)	Military force of DAANES. Recognised as a terrorist proxy by TR. Partner of *Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)*, US.

C. The Ideological Shift to 'Democratic Confederalism'

Following the capture of Öcalan in 1999 by the Turkish security forces, the PKK executed a strategically required ideological shift. Combining elements of libertarian municipalism and communalist socialism, Öcalan spoke the doctrine of Democratic Confederalism:

> *"Democratic confederalism is a non-state social paradigm. It is not based on sovereign statehood, but on local direct democracy, feminist liberation, environmentalism and multi-ethnic self-governance without altering existing international borders."*
>
> **— Abdullah Öcalan, *Democratic Confederalism* (2011)**

D. The PKK Branch in Syria: PYD/YPG and the Qandil pipeline

In 2003, PKK cadres established the Democratic Union Party (PYD) as an underground movement in Syria. Following the Syrian 2011 uprising and the withdrawal of the Assad regime's military from North Syria in 2012, the PYD established its armed wing: the People's Protection Units (YPG).

While the Western allies insist on the legal distinction between the PKK (an FTO) and the YPG (an *OIR* partner), Ankara presents captured intelligence, common leadership cross-deployment and shared ideological iconography as evidence that the YPG operates under the greater Qandil executive command.

1.3 Regional Minorities: Indigenous Assyrians and Syrian Turkmen

The political alignment, armed mobilisation and security of indigenous

Assyrian Christians and Syrian Turkmen are critical variables directly influencing Turkish national security and Western stabilisation calculus.

A. Indigenous Assyrian Christians: Survival, Autonomy and Division

Assyrians are one of upper Mesopotamia's oldest indigenous populations, concentrated historically along the Khabur River and within the Hasakah Governorate. Following the catastrophic ISIS operations in 2014-2015 destroying historical Christian enclaves, Assyrian armed groups split into competing divisions:

1. **Pro-DAANES (MFS & Sutoro)**: Integrated directly into the SDF, they endorse the ideological model of Democratic Confederalism in exchange for constitutionally-recognised minority linguistic rights, co-governance positions and joint territorial defence.
2. **Pro-Regime (GPF & Sootoro)**: Conversely, aligned with the Syrian government, they view DAANES as an unlawful Kurdish-dominated project that threatens historic Assyrian land ownership, education curricula and church safety.

B. Syrian Turkmen: Sovereignty, Proxy Mobilisation and Ankara's Anchor

Syrian Turkmen, an ethnic Turkic minority, play a central role in Ankara's military and diplomatic position in North Syria.

- **Proxy Integration into the SNA**: Turkmen armed divisions are the military backbone of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). They act as primary ground forces during Turkish unilateral operations (*Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch* and *Operation Peace Spring*).
- **Strategic Demographic Buffer**: For Türkiye, while the Turkmen population represents an indigenous obligation, it also represents a strategic asset. Ankara leverages Turkmen political movements to challenge the legitimacy of DAANES, securing a hostile buffer against the YPG along its southern border.

Community	Key Armed Divisions	Strategic Alignment	Security Concerns
Assyrian Christians	• MFS / Sutoro • GPF / Sootoro	• DAANES, SDF • Damascus loyalty	Forced land acquisition, educational curricula disputes and ISIS revival.
Syrian Turkmen	• Sultan Murad Division • Suleiman Shah Brigade (SNA)	Türkiye (Turkish Land Forces proxy)	YPG expansion and Syrian regime air strikes.

C. Implications for NATO Alliance Policy

The alignments and integration of these minority blocs dictates the governance of North Syria. While Western partners point to the presence of MFS forces as proof of the inclusive, multi-ethnic democracy of DAANES under *UN Charter Article 51*

counter-terrorism mandates, Turkish intelligence briefs emphasise the marginalisation of Turkmen communities as evidence of an enforced demographic hegemony, framing YPG border dominance as a threat to Ankara's national security under *NATO Article 5* collective-defence principles.

Module 2: The Counter-ISIS Campaign & the Rise of DAANES

2.1 The ISIS Onslaught, Kobanî and the 2015 SDF Formation

A. The 2014 Kobanî Turning Point

The siege of Kobanî (September 2014 - January 2015) was the invitation for Western military interventions in North Syria. As ISIS forces surrounded the border city, YPG/YPJ (Women's Protection Units) stood up in fierce defence. Recognising the YPG's tactical cohesion and solidity on the ground, the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force - *Operation Inherent Resolve* (CJTF-*OIR*) engaged in intensive close air support and air-dropped munitions, disabling the ISIS advance while establishing a de facto partnership with Kurdish combat units.

B. Assembling the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

U.S. Special Operations Command engineered a structural reorganisation of partner forces on 15 October 2015, in efforts to mitigate Turkish national security objections and expand liberation operations against ISIS into major Arab territories.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was established as a military umbrella, integrating different ethnicities:

- **Command Core**: The YPG/YPJ dominate the tactical command structure, continuing and following up on operations across the frontlines.
- **Arab & Minority Units**: Integrated Arab tribal divisions and Assyrian Christian forces (MFS) to withhold governance legitimacy within the region.
- **Strategic Mission**: A land division for offensive operations against ISIS fortresses under CJTF-*OIR* air supremacy and intelligence sharing.

C. Operational Coordination and NATO Friction

While Western allies relied on the SDF to dismantle the territorial ISIS superpower, Ankara viewed the creation of the umbrella coalition as a cosmetic rebranding to cast a shadow over the YPG's allegiance to the PKK command council in Qandil. This major viewpoint division in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) throws the claimed counter-terrorism requirements under *UN Charter Article 51* directly against collective alliance security commitments under *NATO Article 5*.

2.2 DAANES Governance and the Oil Economy

A. Hydrocarbon Infrastructure and Energy Geography

The financial viability and administrative autonomy of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) fall back on its operational custody over Syria's primary and most strategic hydrocarbon and energy assets:

- **Al-Omar Oil Field Field Complex**: Heavy crude oil source; Syria's largest petroleum field, producing over 50 000 barrels per day pre-2011. Although operating at reduced capacity under the DAANES administration (producing fewer than 5 000 barrels per day) due to structural degradation and lack of modern refining equipment, it remains the administration's economic engine.
- **Conoco Gas Processing Plant**: Natural gas source; a key facility that processes natural gas for power generation and industrial supply. A target for regional power projection, subjecting it to frequent standoff drone and artillery from hostiles across the Euphrates River, it remains the administration's electrification engine.
- **Rumeilan Fields**: Light / medium crude oil sources for local consumption and northern trade.

B. Revenue Streams, Smuggling Networks and Local Taxation

Lacking formal international diplomatic recognition, DAANES operates its economy adaptively:

1. **Intermediary and Black-Market Crude Oil Sales**: The extracted crude oil is sold to local traders, who process it through primitive refining burners. Massive volumes are traded across the Euphrates into Syrian regime-controlled territories or transported northward into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) through informal border crossings for refining and secondary sale.
2. **Taxation and Tariffs**: DAANES imposes transit fees, agricultural taxes and border tariffs on commercial goods entering through eastern trade corridors.
3. **Public Sector Payroll**: Revenue from energy sales funds the SDF military payroll, internal security units, municipal civil servants and heavily subsidised fuel prices to maintain social stability across the population.

C. Geopolitical Vulnerabilities and Tribal Distrust

Control over these energy reserves exposes DAANES to structural vulnerabilities:

- **Regime and Proxy Targeting**: The illegal occupation of national resources prompts periodic military standoff strikes on processing assets near Conoco from the central government in Damascus and affiliated militias.
- **Arab Tribal Complaints**: The concentration of oil wealth in Arab-majority regions managed by Kurdish-dominated DAANES outrages local Arab tribes, whose councils demand higher revenue allocations, economic transparency and control over resource distribution.

2.3 Internal Tribal Dynamics and Security Mechanisms

A. Tribal Demographics & Integration Friction

Expansion into majority-Arab territories forced the SDF to integrate Sunni Arab tribes (mainly Al-Baqqara and Al-Uqaydat). Maintaining stability and control requires navigating persistent governance tensions:

- **Governance Inequality**: Tribe leaders cite exclusion by Kurdish YDP cadres.
- **Conscription (*HXP*) Resistance**: Triggers civil resistance and draft evasion.
- **Resource Allocation**: Complaints over local crude oil extraction without proportional regional allocation.

B. Security Mechanisms & Threats

- **Regime & Proxy Exploitation**: Damascus and Iranian-backed forces use tribal outrage to destabilise the SDF and force CJTF-*OIR* withdrawal.
- **ISIS Exploitation**: Sleeper cells target SDF-aligned tribal elders and municipal infrastructure.
- **Counter-Insurgency**: The Asayish (internal security forces of DAANES) and HAT (anti-terror units of the Asayish) execute high-value target (HVT) raids, population screening and local mediation to protect key roads and checkpoints.

Security Organ	Operational Role	Operational Area
Asayish	Internal policing, urban checkpoints and population security.	Routes and checkpoints across the region
HAT	HVT raids and counter-terror strike operations.	High-threat areas
HXP	Conscripts duty and facility protection.	Defence of bases

Module 3: Human Rights, Governance and Security Challenges

3.1 Detention Infrastructure and Insurgent Radicalisation

Security in North and East Syria is grounded by massive, volatile detention centres holding ISIS-affiliated populations captured following the 2019 ISIS collapse. Overseen by the SDF and guarded by the Asayish, these camps, critical for long-term security, have even specialised sectors for high-risk ISIS women and for children.

- **Youth Radicalisation & Third-Generation Threat**: Minors make up the majority of camp residents. Adolescent boys face systematic ISIS brainwashing and are smuggled out by sleeper networks to reinforce operational cells.

- **Combatant Imprisonment Assets**: Beyond civilians, the SDF holds approximately 9 000 ISIS terrorists in underprepared detention facilities, presenting a constant threat of breakout operations.

3.2 Foreign Terrorist Fighters & Sovereign Repatriation Deadlock

The presence of thousands of foreign combatants and their family members in DAANES facilities has created a huge legal, financial and security deadlock.

- **Sovereignty & Evidentiary Deficits**: Western nations refuse to bring home their radicalised citizens, fearing court and trial failures because evidence collected by the SDF on the battlefield rarely meets the strict chain-of-custody rules required in Western courts. Thus, home governments would risk bringing back dangerous extremists to watch them walk free on their streets.
- **DAANES Administrative Strain**: Lacking international diplomatic recognition, DAANES operates without a legal framework to formally trial or sentence foreign nationals under *International Humanitarian Law (IHL)*.

3.3 Institutional Human Rights & Civil Governance Deficits

International monitoring bodies, including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria, document clear civil governance deficits and infringements across DAANES.

- **Judicial & Detention Deficits**: Asayish and HAT routinely hold suspects for prolonged detentions without rapid judicial review, leaving them facing long delays before appearing in courts without access to lawyers.
- **Child Recruitment & Oppression**: Despite *UN Action Plans*, some SDF units enrol youth (under 18) into support roles. Simultaneously, DAANES maintains tight control over media and civic assembly, causing friction with opposition groups such as the Kurdish National Council in Syria (ENKS).

Module 4: Intra-NATO Friction & International Legal Frameworks

4.1 Cross-Border Military Operations & Control Zones

Since 2016, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), alongside the allied Syrian National Army (SNA), have executed major interventions in North Syria, in efforts to dismantle the YPG, enforce border security and disrupt the PYD-PKK corridor.

- ***Operation Euphrates Shield* (2016-2017)**: TAF and SNA forces secured the Jarabulus–Al-Bab sector, blocking the YPG from connecting its eastern to its western districts.

- ***Operation Olive Branch* (2018)**: An intense campaign that seized control of western districts from the YPG, displacing DAANES governance structures and establishing a Turkish security zone.
- ***Operation Peace Spring* (2019)**: Penetrated the heart of DAANES territory, capturing critical segments of the M4 Highway, the primary strategic link in Northeast Syria, establishing operational contact lines between TAF and SDF.

These operations established a 30-kilometre-deep security buffer zone along the border, providing volatile contact lines where TAF artillery and drone strikes and SNA patrols continuously engage SDF frontlines.

4.2 Turkish Legal Arguments vs. Western Realpolitik

4.2.1 Turkish Legal Justifications & International Treaty Frameworks

The legal battleground regarding Turkish operations exposes strong friction between unilateral state security rights under UN frameworks and collective alliance NATO obligations.

- ***UN Charter Article 51* (Self-Defence)**: Ankara invokes *Article 51*, justifying cross-border operations, for YPG/PKK cross-border attacks pose an ongoing national-security threat. However, this right of defence is questioned as international law typically requires host-nation consent to attack non-state groups inside their nation, as well as reporting to the UN Security Council.
- ***NATO Treaty Article 5* (Collective-Defence)**: While it guarantees collective defence against external attacks on allied territory, unilateral interventions fall outside it, creating a paradox: a NATO member (Türkiye) invoking self-defence while targeting non-state forces partnered with and embedded in them other NATO member (U.S. and French) forces.
- ***The 1998 Adana Agreement* Framework**: Established to force Damascus to suppress PKK activity, it also permitted Turkish security access up to 5 km into Syrian territory under strict conditions. Ankara invokes the agreement to legitimise current security zones, while critics argue that post-2011 occupations exceed the limited counter-terrorism agreement and breach Syrian sovereignty.

4.2.2 U.S. and French Deployments & De Facto Realpolitik

Western NATO allies follow a contradictory strategy, attempting to support SDF counter-ISIS operations while maintaining alliance cohesion with Ankara.

- **Coalition Operational Effects**: U.S. and French forces remain physically embedded within the SDF. While deployed under counter-ISIS operations, their presence acts as a shield, protecting DAANES from Turkish/SNA advances.

- **De Facto Political Receptions**: Western capitals maintain working ties with DAANES without formal state recognition. Ankara views this shielding of Kurdish-led governance as direct complicity with the PKK.
- **Operational Friction & NAC Deadlock**: Turkish artillery and drone strikes near embedded Western forces creates severe hazards, paralysing the North Atlantic Council (NAC) from establishing a unified NATO Levant strategy.

4.3 Note on Syrian State Posture

Damascus rejects both Turkish and Western allies' presence as violations of *UN Charter Article 2, Paragraph 4*, while formally condemning the unauthorised administration of eastern hydrocarbon and agricultural assets.

Module 5: Key Stakeholders & NATO Bloc Positions

Bloc	Primary Objective	Red-Line	NAC Mandate
Sovereign Anti-Terror Axis: Türkiye, Hungary and Eastern Allies (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Czechia)	Neutralisation of YPG/PKK and establishment of permanent sovereign-border security buffers.	Western military's financial or political shielding of DAANES/SDF.	Invoke self-defence rights; demand NAC alignment against PKK-linked organisations under *NATO Article 5*.
Western Counter-ISIS Coalition: U.S., U.K. and France	Permanent defeat of ISIS and regional detention centres security.	Ground operations that weaken SDF counter-terrorism operations or endanger embedded Western units.	Preserve CJTF-*OIR* and *Opération Chammal* and use deconfliction channels to limit TAF/SNA expansion.
Strategic Bridge Ally: Spain	Airspace defence of the Southern Flank and maintaining Mediterranean security and bilateral defence agreement with Ankara.	Alliance crisis or collapse of Southern Flank air-defence.	Maintain deployment of Spain's Patriot Missile Batteries to defend Turkish airspace and act as a diplomatic bridge between Ankara and the Western allies.
Greece	Strict adherence to international law and containment of Turkish unilateral military operations.	Unilateral military incursions that bypass the UN Charter or expand Turkish power across the Mediterranean.	Oppose Ankara's unilateral cross-border initiatives, aligning with France regarding following strict international law.
Neutral De-Escalation Partners: Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and other NATO Member States	Regional stabilisation and prevention of humanitarian crises.	Unilateral cross-border intrusions that violate international legal frameworks.	Push for NAC-mediated de-escalation and diplomatic dialogue.

Module 6: Guided Questions & Points for Debate & Resolution-Writing

6.1 Operational De-Confliction & Alliance Unity Preservation

- What real-time mechanisms and NATO channels must be used to prevent kinetic collision, electronic warfare interference and friendly-fire between Turkish Armed Forces operations and Western allied units and their operations?
- How can NATO continue air-defence missions smoothly, such as the *Patriot Battery deployments* under *NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) framework in southern Türkiye*, while member states strongly disagree?

6.2 Prisoner Custody, Return to Home States & Legal Courts

- In the case of a TAF/SNA operation that dismantles local SDF control, what actions and NATO-pre-approved security responses must be taken to prevent mass breakouts across high-risk ISIS detention facilities?
- How should NATO member states take back, trial and handle their own citizens who fought for ISIS, using the fragmented evidence from the battlefield?

6.3 Balancing Human Rights with UN Frameworks

- How can NATO manage safe return routes for refugees, secure safe zones and essential rebuilding without violation of *UN Charter Article 2, Paragraph 4*?
- What operational frameworks must be integrated into NATO directives to ensure humanitarian aid delivery aligns with *UN Security Council Resolution 2254* (2015) without accidentally legitimising non-state entities?

6.4 Counter-Terrorism Classification vs. Non-State Realpolitik Strategic Relationships

- How can the tension between an ally's self-defence rights against national security threats (PKK/YPG) and other allies' strategic reliance on these exact non-state proxies in counter-terrorism efforts be managed?
- How can NATO military intelligence create a shared terrorism-threat-assessment that aligns both Ankara's and Western priorities?

6.5 Points of Divergence and Heated Friction

- Critics argue that post-2011 Turkish operations, which established a 30-kilometre-deep security buffer zone along the border, exceed the *1998 Adana* agreement framework limit of 5 kilometres.
- Paris repeatedly welcomed YPG representatives at Élysée Palace & the Senate, even expressing support & awarding 'Medals of Honour', outraging Ankara.

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ANNEX VII: CLASSIFIED & OPEN-SOURCE VERIFICATION INDEX
CLASSIFICATION: NATO UNCLASSIFIED / RELEASABLE TO NAC DELEGATIONS
SUBJECT: Legal, Institutional and Operational Reference Citations

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1. INTERNATIONAL LAW & CHARTER FRAMEWORKS
   • UN Charter (1945), Chapter I, Article 2, Paragraph 4:
   [https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1]
   • UN Charter (1945), Chapter VII, Article 51 (Collective Self-Defence):
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   • UNSC Resolution 2254 (2015) (Syrian Political Roadmap):
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   • UNSC Resolution 2249 (2015) (Counter-ISIS Mandate):
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3. OPERATIONS, COALITION COMMAND & SOVEREIGN STATE DEPLOYMENTS
   • Operation Euphrates Shield — Türkiye:
   [https://media.setav.org/en/file/2017/11/operation-euphrates-shield-implementation-and-lessons-learned.pdf]
   • Opération Chammal — French Ministry of the Armed Forces:
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   • Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) — Combined Joint Task Force:
   [https://www.inherentresolve.mil/]
   • Patriot Deployments to Türkiye — NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD):
   [https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/ayudaturquia.html]
   [https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/operatives-fuehrungskommando-der-bundeswehr/patriot-unterstuetzung-tuerkei-6106074]
   • Patriot Mission Adana — Spanish Ministry of Defence:
   [https://ejercito.defensa.gob.es/en/misiones/asia/turquia/98_DESPLIEGUE_PATRIOT_TURQUIA.html]
4. INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING & HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENTS
   • Human Rights Watch (HRW) — Syria:
   [https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/syria]
   • OHCHR — UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria:
   [https://www.ohchr.org/en/search?query=North+Syria&created%5Bmin%5D=&created%5Bmax%5D=&sort_by=search_api_relevance]
   [https://www.ohchr.org/en/search?query=Northern+Syria&created%5Bmin%5D=&created%5Bmax%5D=&sort_by=search_api_relevance]